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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Beck timely appealed form the district court's judgment of conviction. On 
appeal, Mr. Beck asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress the State's evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 11 :30 p.m., Officer Viens activated the overhead lights on his 
patrol car and pulled over Mr. Beck for riding a bicycle without a headlight, which is in 
contravention of Boise City Code § 10-14-03(0). (R., pp.37, 53.) Officer Viens asked 
Mr. Beck if he had a head light for his bicycle and Mr. Beck admitted that he did not. 
(R., p.53.) Officer Viens asked Mr. Beck for identification and Mr. Beck provided him an 
identification card issues by the State of Idaho. (R., p.53; 09/19/12 Tr., p.11, L.25 -
p.12, L.5.) Officer Viens then asked Mr. Beck about his travel plans and Mr. Beck 
stated that he had just gotten out of work and was going to his home. {R., p.53; 
09/19/12 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-22.) 
During his interaction with Officer Viens, Mr. Beck did not display any indications 
or behavior associated with drug use. (09/19/12 Tr., p.43, L.12 - p.44, L.7.) Officer 
Viens testified that Mr. Beck did not appear to be under the influence of any substance. 
(09/19/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.2-7.) Officer Viens also testified that Mr. Beck's behavior was 
normal, that he had no reason to fear for his safety. (09/19/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.8-19.) 
Even though Mr. Beck was not displaying any suspicious behavior, Officer Viens 
then asked Mr. Beck about his criminal record and Mr. Beck stated that he did not have 
any outstanding warrants, but he admitted that he had a prior criminal record. 
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(R., p.53.) Mr. Beck said that he had been in trouble for theft related offenses. 
(R., pp.53-54.) At that point, Officer Viens contacted dispatch to conduct a background 
check. (R., p.53; 09/19/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.12-21.) Officer Viens then asked Mr. Beck if he 
was on either parole or probation and Mr. Beck told him that he topped out in 2005. 
(09/19/12 Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.11.) 
After asking the foregoing questions, Officer Viens received Mr. Beck's 
background report from dispatch, which indicated that Mr. Beck had a criminal history. 
(09/19/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-19.) However, it also indicated that Mr. Beck did not have 
any outstanding warrants, and that Mr. Beck was not on probation or parole. (R., pp.53-
54.) Officer Viens asked Mr. Beck if he had anything illegal in his possession. 
(R., p.54.) Instead of answering the question, Mr. Beck asked Officer Viens if he was 
going to go to jail. (R., p.54.) Officer Viens again asked if Mr. Beck had anything illegal. 
(R., p.54.) Mr. Beck said he did and that it was a diabetic syringe. (R., p.54.) Officer 
Viens then asked if Mr. Beck had anything else which was illegal and if it was 
methamphetamine. (R., p.54.) Mr. Beck nodded his head affirmatively. (R., p.54.) 
Mr. Beck was subsequently arrested. (R., p.54.) 
During the entire interaction with Officer Viens Mr. Beck was never told that he 
was free to leave. (09/19/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-7.) Officer Viens testified that during the 
entire interaction Mr. Beck was detained. (09/19/12 Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.42, L.7.) Officer 
Viens never attempted or intended to write a citation for Mr. Beck's failure to have a 
bicycle headlight. (09/19/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-7, p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.1.) In fact, Officer 
Viens testified that he only asked about the headlight at the beginning of the 
conversation and that all of his subsequent questions for Mr. Beck dealt with parole, 
probation, and Mr. Beck's prior criminal history. (09/19/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.8-22.) 
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Mr. Beck was charged, by information, with possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Beck filed a motion to 
suppress based on a theory that Officer Viens abandoned the original purpose of the 
stop and illegally seized Mr. Beck to investigate unrelated criminal activity without 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Beck was engaging in any criminal activity unrelated to 
the traffic infraction. (R., pp.26-27, 36-41, 53-56.) A hearing was held on the motion 
and trial counsel conceded that the overall length of the traffic stop at issue comported 
with the length of a normal traffic stop which usually lasts about fifteen to twenty 
minutes. (09/19/12 Tr., p.52, Ls.17-25.) However, trial counsel went on to clarify that 
he was challenging that fact that Officer Viens' questions were unrelated to the purpose 
of the stop and, therefore, unreasonably extended the length of the detention. 
(09/19/12 Tr., p.53, Ls.1-13.) The district court determined that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation when Officer Viens asked Mr. Beck general questions about his 
background. (R., p.55.) Then turning to the issue of whether Officer Viens questions 
extended the length of the stop, the district court concluded that there was no Forth 
Amendment violation because Mr. Beck "conceded that the duration of the stop was 
reasonable." (R., p.55.) As such, Mr. Beck's suppression motion was denied by the 
district court. (R., pp.53-54.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Beck pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and preserved the ability to raise the denial of his suppression 
motion on appeal. (R., pp.58-60.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.71-73.) 
Mr. Beck timely appealed. (R., pp.75-77.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Beck's motion to suppress the State's 
evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Beck's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beck argues that the district court erred when it concluded that Mr. Beck 
conceded that the length of his stop was reasonable. Specifically, he argues that trial 
counsel was generally stating that a routine traffic stop lasts about fifteen to twenty 
minutes. However, trial counsel never conceded that Officer Viens' reasonably 
extended the detention when he asked questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop. 
Additionally, Mr. Beck argues that Officer Veins unreasonably extended the duration of 
the stop when he asked Mr. Beck questions after receiving the background report from 
dispatch because at that point the reason for the stop had been effectuated and Officer 
Viens had not discovered any new facts which could be the basis for reasonable 
suspicion that some criminal activity, unrelated to the traffic infraction, was afoot. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 
336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted; 
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found are freely 
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001). At a suppression hearing, the 
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 
Idaho 102, 106 (1995). 
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C. Officer Veins Unreasonably Extended The Traffic Stop By Asking Questions 
Unrelated To The Purpose Of The Stop 
The Idaho and Federal Constitutions protect "[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Idaho CONST. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these 
constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of 
discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and 
security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The U.S. 
constitution's safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the 
seizures of persons through detentions falling short of arrest or arrests. United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The 
stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is, therefore, subject to the 
constitutional restraints. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998). A 
vehicle stop is of limited magnitude compared to other types of seizures; however, it is 
nonetheless a "constutionally cognizable" intrusion and, therefore, may not be 
conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or 
other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2001 ); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
498 (1983). Although the required information leading to formation of reasonable 
suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information required to form 
probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch on the part of 
the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005). The 
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reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the seizure. Flowers, 131 Idaho at 208. 
In the case at hand, Officer Viens observed Mr. Beck riding a bicycle at nighttime 
without a light which is required under Boise City Code § 10-14-03(0). (R., p.53.) As 
such, Mr. Beck does not challenge the legality of the initial detention. However, he 
asserts that Officer Viens unreasonably extended the stop. Specifically, he argues that 
Officer Vein unreasonably extended the stop for approximately twelve to fifteen seconds 
when he asked Mr. Beck incriminating questions after receiving the report from 
dispatch. 
1. Mr. Beck Did Not Concede That Officer Viens' Questions Reasonably 
Delayed The Stop 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Beck must first address the question of whether he 
conceded that the duration of the stop was reasonable. Trial counsel's statement at the 
end of the suppression hearing, while inartful, merely clarified that the overall length of 
Mr. Beck's stop was about the average length of time required for a routine traffic stop. 
However, trial counsel never abandoned the claim that Officer Viens' questions 
temporarily extended the stop in a manner which was unreasonable. Trial counsel' 
specific statements are are follows: 
I will concede this point. I'll concede that the stop didn't exceed what was 
necessary to carry out the purpose for the stop. I don't think there is any 
question that that is probably true. A typical infraction would probably take 
ten or 15 minutes to write out and that interaction was fairly brief. So I 
concede that. 
Our issue in this case is whether or not the questioning was 
carefully tailored to the purpose of the stop and the fact that Officer Viens 
did not carefully restrict his questions to the purpose of the stop, which 
required unless some other particularized, objective reasons come up to 
make him suspicious of criminal activity. 
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Officer Viens himself testified the he had no intention of giving 
Mr. Beck an infraction. So this wasn't about the headlight, it was about 
finding other criminal activity which he ultimately did. But without 
justification. 
(09/19/12 Tr., p.52, L.18- p.53, L.12.) 
Mr. Beck's characterization of trial counsel's statements is consistent with the 
memorandum filed in support of his suppression motion. For example, Mr. Beck 
recognized in his brief that in Idaho it is not unreasonable for one officer to ask 
questions while another officer was running a background check on the driver's driving 
status or filling out a citation. (R., p.39.) Mr. Beck did argue that once the purpose of 
the stop has been effectuated it is unreasonable for an officer to extend the stop 
temporally to ask questions unrelated to the stop, unless the officer discovered new 
facts which could expand the scope of the initial stop. (R., p.39.) Mr. Beck then argued 
that since Officer Viens' questions were unrelated to the stop and that Officer Viens did 
not discover any new facts creating suspicion unrelated to the initial stop and, therefore, 
Officer Viens' questions unreasonably extended the length of the stop. (R., pp.39-40.) 
In sum, trial counsel merely made a general statement that the fifteen minute 
length of the stop was not inherently unreasonable. However, he never conceded that 
Officer Viens' questions which extended the stop constituted an unreasonable extension 
of the stop. Therefore, the district court erred when it concluded that trial counsel 
conceded that the length of the stop was reasonable. 
2. The Questions Officer Viens Asked Mr. Beck After Receiving The 
Report From Dispatch Unreasonably Extended The Duration Of 
The Stop 
Now turning to the substance of Mr. Beck's argument, to wit, that Officers Viens' 
questions unreasonably extended the stop. A routine traffic stop is normally limited in 
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scope and of short duration; therefore, it is more analogous to an investigative detention 
than a custodial arrest and, as such, is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-654. Under Terry, an investigative 
detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify 
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity. Id. at 21. 
The question of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires an 
inquiry into both whether the officer's action was justified at the inception, and whether it 
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000). However, the 
purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated; a routine traffic stop might 
turn up suspicious circumstances that justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the 
stop. Id. at 362. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention 
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Further, an individual "may not be detained even 
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. In United 
States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001), the court held that, "[f]urther detention 
was not lawful after the point at which the purposes of the stop [were] resolved." Id. at 
398. 
It is therefore not necessarily a constitutional violation for an officer who has 
stopped someone for a traffic violation to ask unrelated questions about drugs or to run 
a drug dog around the outside of the vehicle. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563 
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(Ct. App. 2005). Idaho Courts have held that the questioning and use of a drug dog 
during a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it does not extend the 
duration of the stop beyond that which was necessary to address the traffic violation. 
See State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-853 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an officer's 
request to search a car was lawful where the request was made before the issuance of 
the traffic citation had been completed and such request lengthened the process only by 
a second or two); see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363 (holding that it was 
permissible for one officer to question a vehicle's driver about drugs and weapons and 
to take a drug dog around the car while another officer was busy checking with dispatch 
on the driver's status and writing out a traffic citation). 
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unwarranted 
intrusion upon the vehicle occupants' privacy and liberty for an officer to question a 
driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose 
of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651-653. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that a motorist had been unlawfully detained 
where all routine traffic stop procedures had been completed when additional officers 
arrived and then requested consent to search the vehicle. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 
532 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Officer Viens improperly extended the stop beyond the purpose of issuing a 
citation for failing to have a headlight for the bicycle. Specifically, the stop was 
unreasonably extended for a period of twelve to fifteen seconds which occurred after 
Officer Viens received confirmation form dispatch that Mr. Beck had no outstanding 
warrants. At that point in time, Officer Viens had fully effectuated the purpose of the 
stop and had the choice of telling Mr. Beck he was free to leave or he could have written 
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Mr. Beck a citation for failing to have a headlight on his bicycle. Instead, Officer Viens 
detained Mr. Beck to begin a new criminal investigation without any reasonable 
suspicion when he asked Mr. Beck if he had anything illegal. (R., p.54.) Mr. Beck did 
not answer the question and asked Officer Viens if he was going to jail. (R., p.54.) 
Officer Viens then asked Mr. Beck if he had anything illegal. (R., p.54.) Mr. Beck 
answered that question with an incriminating response. (R., p.54.) According to the 
audio recording of the stop, the delay caused by these questions was approximately 
twelve to fifteen seconds. (State's Exhibit 1, 6:00 - 6:22.) The twelve to fifteen second 
delay was unreasonable because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Support for Mr. Beck's argument can be found in State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865 
(Ct. App. 2007), where one of the issues on appeal was whether an officer's decision to 
observe Gomez for visual signs of inebriation while another officer visually inspected the 
interior of a car unreasonably extended what was otherwise a constitutionally valid 
seizure. In that case, Gomez was pulled over for speeding. Id. at 867. Officer Sullivan 
noticed that Gomez's eyes were red, but he could not smell the odor of alcohol. Id. 
Gomez was subsequently cited for speeding. Id. Gomez was then delayed for twelve 
to sixteen seconds after he received the citation for, among other things, Officer Sullivan 
to observe Gomez for signs of intoxication and to confirm that the citation was signed 
and in order. Id. at 869. During these twelve to sixteen seconds another officer 
observed a gun case in Gomez's car. Id. Gomez was eventually arrested for the 
charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 868. Gomez filed a suppression 
motion and argued that the twelve to sixteen second delay was an unreasonable delay 
unrelated to speeding. Id. Gomez's motion was denied and Gomez appealed. Id. 
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On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals ultimately held that under the unique 
circumstances surrounding his encounter with the police the twelve to sixteen second 
delay was reasonable. Id. at 869. In coming to this conclusion, the Gomez Court held 
that the fact that Gomez had red eyes, did not know how fast he was going, and had a 
spoke in a rapid and broken pattern justified the continuation of the stop to observe for 
other signs of intoxication. Id. 
While Gomez lost his appeal, the case is instructive in this matter because the 
mere delay of twelve to sixteen seconds was deemed long enough by the Court of 
Appeals to be analyzed under Fourth Amendment principles. When compared to the 
facts in this case, the twelve to fifteen second delay is unreasonable because Officer 
Viens had no particularized facts from which he could develop reasonable suspicion to 
delay the stop to begin an investigation unrelated to the initial traffic infraction. Officer 
Viens testified that Mr. Beck did not display any indications or behavior associated with 
drug use. (09/19/12 Tr., p.43, L.12 - p.44, L.7.) Officer Viens also testified that 
Mr. Beck did not appear to be under the influence of any substance. (09/19/12 
Tr., p.44, Ls.2-7.) Officer Viens went on to testify that Mr. Beck's behavior was normal, 
that he had no reason to fear for his safety, and dispatch confirmed that Mr. Beck did 
not have any outstanding warrants, and that Mr. Beck was not on probation or parole. 
(09/19/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.8-19.) As such, Officer Viens was not aware of any facts which 
would justify extending the stop to ask Mr. Beck if he possessed anything illegal. 
Additionally, Officer Viens had abandoned the initial purpose of the stop when he 
asked Mr. Beck if he possessed anything illegal. Officer Viens never attempted to write 
a citation for Mr. Beck's failure to have a bicycle headlight. (09/19/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-7.) 
Officer Viens also testified that he never intended to write citation for Mr. Beck's failure 
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to have a headlight. (09/19/12 Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.1.) In fact, Officer Viens testified 
that he only asked about the headlight at the beginning of the conversation and that all 
of his subsequent questions for Mr. Beck dealt with parole, probation, and Mr. Beck's 
prior criminal history. (09/19/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.8-22.) 
In the event this Court determines that Officer Viens unreasonably extended the 
duration of the stop, then all of the evidence discovered after that illegal detention must 
be suppressed. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). 
Moreover, Mr. Beck raised his claims under both the United States Constitution and the 
Idaho Constitution. (R., p.36.) Pursuant to Idaho CONST. Art. I, § 17, the remedy is 
suppression of the State's evidence. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). 
In sum, Officer Viens abandoned the purpose of the stop and began an unrelated 
criminal investigation for which he had no facts supporting reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Beck was engaging in any illegal activity unrelated to the traffic infraction. As such, 
Officer Viens illegally extended the stop for a period of twelve to fifteen seconds, a delay 
which has been deemed long enough to be subject to scrutiny under Fourth 
Amendment principles. Gomez, 144 Idaho at 869. Since the extension of the stop was 
not justified under the foregoing Fourth Amendment principles, Mr. Beck was illegally 
seized and all of the evidence subsequently discovered by Officer Viens which resulted 
from that illegal detention must be suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Beck respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2013. 
~~---
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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